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Abstract 
Information transfer and display issues associated with 
the dissemination of hazardous weather warnings are studied in 
the context of windshear alerts. Operational and developmental 
windshear detection systems are briefly reviewed. The July 11, 
1988 microburst events observed as part of the Denver TDWR 
operational evaluation are analyzed in terms of information 
transfer and the effectiveness of the microburst alerts. 
Information transfer, message content and display issues 
associated with microburst alerts generated from ground based 
sources (Doppler Radars, LLWAS and PREPS) ars evaluated 
by means of pilot opinion surveys and part task simulator 
studies. 
1. Introduction 
Technological advances in ground-to-cockpit datalink 
capability, information display, and hazardous weather detection 
create the possibility for new and improved methods of informing 
flight crews about weather hazards. However, the availability of 
increased information and multiple modes of communication also 
lead to problems of system integration. Issues including the 
selection, aansfer. and presentation of information must be 
addressed in the development of advanced systems for the 
display of hazardous weather information. In addition, design 
procedures, centered around the needs of the flight crew and the 
capabilities of the available equipment, should be applied. 
The display and information transfer issues related to 
advanced windshear alerting systems in the terminal area have 
been chosen as an initial point of focus. This problem was 
chosen both to investigate general issues related to the 
dissemination of hazardous weather information and to focus on 
specific issues of a critical near term need. Windshear in the 
teiminal area is one of the most dangerous weather-related 
problems faced by aviation today .[I]. The real-time detection of 
windshear hazards is a very active field of research,[2,3,4] and 
thus provides a useful testing ground for issues related to 
advanced data uplink and display of hazardous we at he^ 
informadon. 
2. Background 
2 . 1  Terminal Area Windshear 
Low-altitude windshear is the leading weather-related 
cause of fatal aviation accidents in the U.S. Since 1964, there 
have been 26 accidents attributed to windshear resulting in over 
500 fatalities [1,5]. Low-altitude windshear can take several 
forms. Macroscopic forms, such as gustfronts caused by 
colliding warm and cold air masses, can generally be predicted 
and avoided. However, the small intense downdrafts known as 
microbursts are far more dangerous and difficult to detect. 
Microbursts begin with a cool downdraft formed at the base of a 
cumulus or cumulonumbus cloud. If the downdraft is strong 
enough to impact the surface, it spreads out radially and creates 
an small area (1 to 4 krn in diameter) of intense w~ndshear. Such 
conditions typically last for short periods (10-30 n~in), bur can be 
very dangerous to aircraft at low altitudes, particularly on takeoff 
or final approach Initially, the aircraft experiences a suong 
headwind, which causes a momentary increase in lift. Next, the 
aircraft enters an area of downdraft, and then a sharp tailwind. 
This combination results in loss of effective airspeed and 
corresponding loss of lift. (Fig. 1). It may also serve to 
destablilize the flight trajectory. The resulting performance loss 
can in some cases be sufficient to result in ground impact. In 
addition, microbursts can be accompanied by strong edge 
vortices, which can further destabilize the aircraft. Most fatal 
windshear accidents have been attributed to rnicrobursts.[5] 
An additional factor which makes microbursts parricularly 
dangerous is that they are generally not obvious either visually or 
to standard airborne weather radar. Microbursts have been 
observed to occur both during periods of severe rain or during 
periods of litfle or no low-altitude precipitation. For 
meteorological and instrumentation purposes, it is [convenient to 
distinguish between 'wet' and 'dry' microbursts. .Dry 
microbursts, more common in the western U.S., can sometimes 
be detected by the presence of curling clouds of dust on the 
ground or vertical cloud shafts known as 'virga'. 'Wet 
microbursts cannot generally be distiguished from benign rain 
cells with radar reflectivity information. 
Microbursts have been observed with intensities geater 
than most aircraft could be reasonably expected to survive. 
Avoidance is the best way to handle a windshear h,lzard. This 
indicates a need for reliable remote detection, allowing the flight 
crew adequate advance warning to plan and execute a maneuver 
to avoid microburst penetration. 
Fig. I: Microburst windshear encounter ow approach 
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2 .2  Microburst  Detection 
2 . 2 . 1  Cur ren t  Procedures 
C m n l :  procedures for microburst detection and warning 
center around the Low-Level Windshear Alert System (LLWAS), 
Rlot reports, and improved pilot education through efforts such 
as the FAA's Windshear Training Aid.[6] LLWAS is a system 
of anemometers currently in service at most major U.S. airports 
designed to measure shifts in wind speed and direction within the 
airport perimeter. Although capable of detecting macroscopic 
phenomena such as gustfronts, the anemometer spacing is larger 
than the characteritic surface dimension of many microbursts, and 
thus LLWAS remains fairly ineffective for detection of 
microburst windshear. The Windshear Training Aid states that 
" I f  an LLWAS alert (triggered by wind speed and/or direction 
differential) occurs, it indicates the presence of something shear- 
like, though not necessarily indicative of magnitude or location. 
However, the absence of an alert does not necessarily indicate 
that it is safe to proceed!".[6] 
Pilot n:ports (PREPS) of windshear provide the most 
reliable data. The availability of PREPS necessarily requires that 
an aircraft penetrate a microburst, which is not desirable; but the 
infomadon, unlike LLWAS, provides conclusive evidence of a 
windshear haz,ard for subsequent aircraft. It is desirable to 
integrate PIRElPS with any sensor data available in future 
windshear detection systems. 
The Windshear Training Aid itself is designed to inform 
pilots and controllers about windshear, primarily how to 
recognize and avoid or recover from microburst encounters. 
Avoidance is ~~racticed through the use of LLWAS information, 
weather reports, and visual clues. In past accidents, these clues 
have been iargely ignored; increased windshear training emphasis 
is being used to increase pilot awareness of these events. 
However, high pilot workload in the terminal area and the relative 
rarity of hazardous windshear makes it difficult for crews to fully 
assimilate the evidence of windshear before penetration. 
2 .2 .2 :  Emerging Windshear  Detection 
Technolog ies  
To meet the need for improved windshear warning, new 
systems for detection are under development. Both airborne and 
ground-based systems are under consideration. Airborne look- 
ahead systems are still primarily experimental: candidate 
rechnologies include doppler radar, doppler lidar, and infrared 
radiometry. ['2,3,4] To be an effective, dependable windshear 
avoidance tool, an airborne system must be able to detect 
windshear ahead of the aircraft to a range of 1 - 3 km, thus 
typically providing 15 to 45 seconds of warning. Also, the 
sensor shoulcl work for either wet or dry microbursts with 
enough resolution to adequately measure size and intensity. 
None of the methods mentioned have yet fully demonstrated 
these capabilities in flight. 
Ground-based remote sensing technology is much more 
developed. LLWAS and PIREPS often yield useful data, but are 
not always available or accurate. Ground-based doppler radars 
have been succesfully demonstrated for microburst detection 
(JAWS, Huntsville, Denver) [5] and have an advantage over 
airborne systems in terms of ground clutter suppression, size and 
power. E~peximents~performed at Huntsville, AL in 1986 and at 
Denver in 1987 and 1988 have shown impressive results (Table 
1). The predominance of wet microbursts at Huntsville and dry 
mimbursts Denver shows the versatility of the ground-based 
doppler r a h .  The ability of such systems to integrate data aloft 
with wind measurements near the surface allows for earlier 
forecasting of microburst locations and outflow strengths. 
MICROBURST DETECTION 
Combined 90% 100% 92% 5% 
GUST-FRONT DETECTION 
Robability 01 drlrctloll Probabl l l l~  
Dau o V s 1 5 m i r  A V ~ 1 5 m l r  df r& . I a rm 
Denver 1987 81% 93% 5% 
oV - M wlrd change m rhelrrcp$on (Only cvmu mh AV vllvcl prrmathm LO nVa rr rcard) 
Table 1:Doppler r a d a r  windshear detection results [7] 
The demonstrated capability of ground-based doppler 
radar for windshear detection and forecasting makes it the most 
viable system for near term use for microburst avoidance 
information. The combination of doppler radar, improved 
LLWAS systems and PIREPS makes an integrated ground-based 
system the primary focus for system integration and automated 
datalink issues. 
2 . 3  Ground-to-Air Data Transfer  
Digital ground-to-air data transfer is an area under active 
development. Several methods of digital ground-to-air data 
transmission are currently or nearly available. ACARS, a 
privately-sponsored system for the uplink and downlink of digital 
information related to commercial aviation, is currently in use by 
many major airlines. It provides a high-speed alphanumeric 
datalink for flight management information, helping to relieve 
congestion on crowded ATC voice frequencies. With the 
addition of satellite relays, ACARS coverage will extend to most 
international commercial air routes. The first satellite 
transmissions are expected to begin in the third quarter of 1989 in 
the Pacific Ocean region [8]. 
Another system stated for near-term deployment is the 
FAA's Mode-S surveillance datalink. Mode-S is an extension of 
the altitude encoding Mode-C transponder in the ATC Radar 
Beacon System allowing message delivery from ATC to 
individual aircraft. Each individual message can cany 48 useful 
bits of information, and the time for the interrogation beam to 
scan the entire coverage area is 4 to 12 seconds. Messages can 
be also be linked in groups of up to 4 frames or sent as a longer 
Extended Length Message with less urgency. 
In the long term, the Aviation Satellite Communications 
System (SatCom) is being developed. The goal is a standardized 
worldwide system for digital voice and data communications, 
based on nine existing satellites in geosynchronous orbit.[9] 
Other systems such as digital ATIS or enroute weather channels 
are also envisioned for future development. 
2 . 4  Information Transfer  Issues in the 1988 Denver 
TDWR Evaluation 
An event which illustrates many of the information 
transfer issues occurred during the 1988 Terminal Doppler 
Weather Radar (TDWR) operational demonsnation at S tapelton 
International Airpon in Denver. On July 11, a period of severe 
microburst activity occurred. It is instructive to evaluate the 
warnings and responses of the five aircraft which initiated and 
abandoned approaches immediately prior to the closure of the 
*on. 

w a  an area of precipitation southwest of the airport and a region 
of 25 kt windshear within 2 miles of the airport center. By 2207 
UTC. a gusdront had developed over the airport with some light 
precipitation. Several microbursts had developed with the 
gustfront including a 45 kt headwind to tailwind cell located on 
the approach to runways 26L and 26R. By 2212 UTC the 
microbunt had increased in strength to 80 kts and the 
precipitation 11ad increased. This microburst event continued at 
high intensity to 2222 UTC when it began to abate. Windshear 
values of 30 kts were still being measured at 2230. 
The altitude versus time plots generated from Mode C 
transponder replies for the 5 aircraft which initiated approaches 
between 220:J and 2214 UTC are shown in Fig. 5. Also shown 
are the times st which microburst alerts were given to the aircraft 
and the time of reported missed approach. All aircraft which 
penetrated the microburst reported intense windshear. 
Transcripts of the verbal microburst alerts given to each aircraft 
by the local tower controller are presented in Table 2. It is 
unknown if there were any microburst alerts issued to these 
aircraft by the TRACON approach conuoller. However, the fact 
that 4 of the 5 aircraft elected to continue the approach indicates 
that this was unlikely. 
2 .4 .:4 Implications of the July 11 Experience 
Several issues important to the development of microburst 
alerting systeims are apparent from this data The variability in 
aircrew interpretation of microburst warnings can be seen by 
comparing thic response of aircraft A to that of aircraft B. The 
aircraft were approaching parallel runways and were issued 
virtually identical alerts within 30 seconds of each other. Aircraft 
A elected to i:mrnediately abandon the approach based on the 
microburst alicrt and visual observations of a descending rain 
shaft. This aircraft never penetrated the primary rnicroburst area. 
Aircraft B elected to continue the approach, penetrated the 
rnicroburst, and descended to within 100 ft of the runway 
threshold before executing a missed approach. 
Another issue which arises from the data is the delay 
between the generation and the voice transmission of the alert to 
the by ATC. Fig.6 plots the delay to alert for each aircraft 
bas e j'irst TDWR generated microburst alert at 22:06: 17 
UTC and the assumption that no alerts were given to these 
aircraft by the TKUCON. It can be seen that the shortest delay 
was approxh~ately 60 seconds and that a delay of 350 seconds 
untered for the last aircraft to report to the tower 
E). The delays in excess of 100 seconds are likely a 
e effort to make the TDWR alerts apex  like LLWAS 
alerts. The primary windshear alert responsibility therefore 
rested with the tower controller who did not have contact with the 
aircraft until they were at the outer marker. It does appear, 
however, that a minimum delay of approximately 60 seconds can 
be expected fix the dissemination of verbal alerts even if the 
is in contact with the controller who has alerting 
responsibility.. 
A third issue which arises is that the initial microburst 
alert for each was imbedded within a routine landing 
clearance message. The routineness of the message may have 
resulted in a lack of urgency associated with the alert. This 
possible lack of urgency coupled with the high cockpit workload 
which occurs at the outer marker may have contributed to the 
difficulty some crews had in fully assessing the magnitude of the 
hazard. It is also worth noting that the tower controller relied 
primarily on  he alphanumeric display. It is interesting to 
consider whether his level of urgency may have increased if he 
had access to the geographical situation display and could have 
more easily visualized how the situation was developing. 
The f a a l  point which comes out of the analysis is the 
importance of PIREPS. Both the flight crews and the tower 
controlleh were more likely to react conservatively to the 
microbmt alert afyr several aircraft had gone around and 
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Fig. 6 :  Delay between first microburst alert and  
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Alrcraft A 
22:07:15 "Aircraft A. Denver tower, nmway two six r i g h  cleahd to 
land Mcmtunt  ale$ mvrt ie ld  wind two two zno at none. 
a forty knot loss. one mlle fmal as m p w d  by machine, no 
pl la  repon." 
Alrcraft B 
22:07:35 " A u d  B. Dcnvertower. mnway two six left dcarcd to 
land. Winds two one zero at five, a forty knot loss, one mile 
f m l  microbunt ale* nci $ubsrantiated by aircraft." 
Aircraft C 
22:09:35 "Aircraft C heavy. Dmvcrtower, rnicmbunt den.  threshold 
wmd one four zcm at five. apccr  e fifry knor loss. two mile 
fmal. runway two six lch. d a d  w land." 
22: 11 :05 "Aircraft D. cauuon have turbulence fmm the heavy DC-8. 
He 1s gomg amtmd. We have a microbunt den,  thrcshold 
winds, zcm nlne zcm at thru. Expca a seventy ha loss on 
a &me mllc fmal." 
22:11:45 "Microbunt d e n  m w a y  two six. Threshold wmd, m e  five 
zem at five, cxpcct an eighty knot loss on a t h m  mtlc f d . "  
22:12:05 "Aircraft E. microbunt alcn, threshold wind one six zem at 
six, cxpcn an eighty knot loss on a r h m  mile fmal. say 
rcquur" 
Table 2: Transcripts of verbal microburst alerts 
issued to each aircraft. 
reported wind shear. This, coupled with the increasing 
microburst intensity, explains why the later aircraft initiated their 
missed approaches at higher altitudes than aircraft B which had 
no PREP infoxmation to c o n f i i  the microburst alert. 
3. Research on Windshear Detection and Warning in 
the Advanced ATC Environment 
3 . 1  Problem Statement 
The integration of ground-based information sources with 
digital datalinks such as Mode-S shows great potential for the 
accurate prediction and delivery of microburst windshear alerts 
with minimal delay. Fig. 7 illustrates possible information flow 
configurations for such a system. The multiple potential data 
paths are dependent on the acceptable degree of automation. 
Clearly, the delay between detection and alert is minimized with a 
fully automated process whereby computer algorithms determine 
alerts from PREPS, TDWR, and LLWAS data and use Mode-S 
to directly distribute them. However, putting the controller in the 
loop to some degree would help filter false alarms and more 
efficiently control the destination of the data. 
Fig 7: Possible windshear data distribution in the 
advanced ATC environment. 
A number of other information issues also require 
consideration. The content, riming, transmission. and 
presentation of windshear information all need to be determined 
Automated links such as Mode-S are subject to bit limitations and. 
reliability considerations. This has an impact on message content 
and dismbution. The timing and priority of alerts InUSF be 
considered to get maximum efficiency and to generate the least 
possible confusion. The high workload of both controllers and 
flight crews during terminal area operations adds ii further 
measure of difficulty. Finally, the varying levels of insmrument 
sophistication in civil aircraft must be considered The advanced 
moving map displays in modem nansport category aircraft allow 
for development of user-oriented graphical presentations, while 
many general aviation aircraft have no visual display capability. 
3.2 Investigations 
Several investigations are being performeci to address the 
issues discussed above. Flight crew opinion surveys are being 
used to obtain user input on a number of factors. Data is sought 
on current operational issues such as LLWAS and other available 
windshear information sources, as well as pilot perceptions of the 
microburst threat. Also, issues of data transmission and 
presentation are addressed. In addition, some issues are k ing  
addressed through flight simulation studies. A simple experiment 
based on a g e n d  aviation simulator was conduct& to compare 
voice communication with maohical data oresentation modes. 
Also, a part-task simulatio<oithe ~oeing757fl67 has been 
developed in order to do more sophisticated investigation into 
optimization of graphical warning formats, information content 
and delivery timing, and the effect on pilot workload. 
3.3 Results 
3 . 3 . 1  Current Windshear Procedures 
For user input on current windshear alert systems and 
requirements for future systems, a pilot opinion survey is being 
conducted. A preliminary sample of 20 United Airlines line and 
training pilots has been completed, and a further dismbution of 
250 is underway. Initial results show several consistent nends. 
It is almost universally agreed (94%) that microbursis pose a 
major safety hazard to transport aircraft. Fifty-three percent of 
the respondents have had what they considered to be a hazardous 
windshear encounter, most incidents occurred at DEN, a United 
operations hub. When posed the question "Currently available 
windshear alert data is sufficient for safe o~eration in the remind 
area," only 17% of the respondents agreed, while 56% 
disagreed. All but one of the pilots felt that "...a system to 
provide aircrews with better and more timely winclshear dens is 
necessary." The results clearly indicate that flight crews are not 
completely confident in currently available data and would be 
very receptive to improvements. Fi y r e  8 shows the pilots' 
average ranking of possible sources of windshear infomation. 
PIREPS Visual Clues LLWAS Weath'sr Radar 
Fig. 8: Pilot ranking of windshear infolrmairion 
sources.  
Significantly, PIREPS and visual clues are both 
considered mor'e useful for windshear avoidance than LLWAS 
alerts. Yet, neither pilot reports or visual clues are always 
available; his underlines the need for a detection system which 
can reliably provide some degree of advance warning. 
3.3.2 ]Modes of Information Presentation 
Because: of the high workload in terminal area operations, 
it is important to consider the manner in which information is 
presented to the flight crew. This was illustrated by the Stapelton 
incidenr even though data was available, it was difficult to 
effectively comaunicate it to the flight crew. There are several 
possible modes of information presentation in the cockpit: voice, 
hlphanmric ,  or graphical. 1;sues to be considered iriclude 
crew workload. ~references. and the ca~abilities of the aircraft 
insrmmenrado~.' The widespread use df CRT displays in modern 
transpon aircraft, for example, opens up new possibilities for 
totally automated graphical information displays. Moving map 
displays, such as the Electronic Right Instrumentation System 
(EFIS) used on the Boeing 757-767 generation of aircraft, are 
good candidates for display of critical weather information. 
Responses from the pilot survey indicate that pilots are 
receptive to graphic displays. (Fig. 9). The specific suggestion 
of integrating windshear information with an EFIS-type moving 
map display was strongly supported. Also of interest was the 
preference of A'TC voice alerts over alphanumeric links or ATIS 
information. Comments received indicated that the low ranking 
of ATIS was due to the time between updates. 
EFlS ATC Alt Graph Alpha ATlS 
Fig. 9: Pilot rankings of possible relaylpresentation 
modes of windshear information from the 
groulnd 
A preliminary experiment has been conducted with a 
general aviation simulator to compare the efficiency of voice and 
graphical modes of presentation. Eight GA pilots with 210 to 
1,700 total flight hours were tested. The scenario involved a 
microburst which appeared during an ILS approach, when the 
aircraft reached ~e outer marker. Avoidance of the microburst 
required a non-standard missed approach. The information was 
presented by voice, on a runway-fixed graphic display of 
nucroburst position, and on a graphic display show~ng both the 
mimburst and sircraft positions. The data (Table 3) shows the 
effectiveness of the graphic displays. Avoidance improved 
significantly with the graphic displays, even though the same 
information was presented at the same time in each case. 
Presentation Type Avoidance Rate 
Voice (JAWS format) 43% 
Runway-Fixed Graphical Display: 
Microburst position only 62% 
Runway-Fixed Graphical Display: 
Microburst + Aircraft position 94% 
Table 3: Results of experiment with general aviation 
simulator and computer graphic display. 
These results considered, the incident at Stapelton Airport 
serves as an illustration of the problems of voice communication. 
Crew and ATC workload in terminal phases of flight is high, 
leading to possible confusion and error. The simulation indicates 
that even under fairly light workload, the difficulty involved in 
fully interpreting the mi&oburjt threat from a voice warning can 
mean the difference between avoidance and ~enetration. Further 
evaluation of communication modes, inc~ucl&~ a variety of 
alphanumeric and graphic formats, will be performed with the 
part-task 757f767 simulator. 
3.3.3 Message content and timing 
The issue of what data is necessary and when it should be 
presented is important for either voice or digital transmission. In 
either case, a limited amount of information can be contained, and 
the timing must be determined to give the crew maximum 
awareness while minimizing the increase in workload An initial 
viewpoint can be obtained from the pilot surveys. The responses 
indicate that location and intensity of microbursts are clearly the 
most important information items. Size, microburst movement, 
and intensity trends are of secondary importance, and shape data 
is generally felt to be inconsequential. 
Location 
Intensity 
Size 
Movement 
Inten. Trend 
Shape 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Higher Priority 
Fig. 10: Pilot ranking of microburst information by 
importance 
The issues of what constitutes a hazardous ~croburs t ,  
who should be informed, and when are more difficult to resolve. 
The s w e y s  are. less clear in this case; the most common 
response was that aircraft should be alerted as soon as 
microbursts are detected anywhere around the airport vicinity. A 
few pilots defined a parricular phase of flight, i.e. at the outer 
marker, when cleared for approach, or immediately upon entering 
the terminal area, as the best point for delivery of microburst 
alerts. 
Ln response to a question about threshold shear levels, 
there was general agreement that a windshear advisory should be 
issued for approximately 10 knots of head-to-tail shear and a 
warning for 15 knots of shear. Also, it was almost unanimously 
expressed that decisions about the threat posed by windshear in a 
particular situation should be made entirely by the pilot, and the 
conmller's role should be to maintain safe separation during 
avoidance maneuvers. However, it remains to be determined 
what locations and intensities of microbursts actually constitute a 
threat in the view of the pilot It is impractical to plan on 
dismbution of all available windshear information in raw form to 
all aircraft in a congested terminal area. Some 'threshold hazard 
level' needs to be defined, based not only on the windshear 
intensity of the microburst, but including other factors such as the 
microburst and aircraft locations, aircraft altitude, and desired 
flight path. 
3.4 Current Research 
Research to resolve these issues is being conducted with 
the part-task 7571767 simulation shown in Fig. 11. The 
simulation uses an IRIS 2400T graphics computer, an autopilot 
control panel, and an EFIS control panel to duplicate the 
electronic instrumentation and flight dynamics of the aircraft. 
Data from TDWR experiments is used to generate simulated 
airborne weather radar returns and the windfield over the airport. 
RADAR 
DATA 
MODE S AIRBORNE 
COMM RADAR 
SIMULATION SIMULATION 
Figure 11: Part-Task 7571767 EFIS Simulation 
The initial simulations are based on data provided by 
NCAR and the Lincoln Laboratory TDWR evaluations. The 
Stapelton incident is very well documented, and serves as a 
model for scenario consauction. With a suitable sidetask, 
workload levels will be properly adjusted to get a reasonable 
range of pilot responses. Once the simulation is validated and a 
range of scenarios developed, issues of information format can 
be explored. Simulations of Mode-S transmissions with varying 
alphanumeric and graphic alert formats can be added, as well as 
voice communications, and the differences in pilot decision 
making and reaction time can be measured. If the results are 
commensurate with the results of the earlier general aviation 
simulations, more specific tests can be performed. These will 
center around more specific information issues, such as warning 
content, timing, and display formats. 
4. Conclusion 
Based on the above, the following points car1 be made: 
Technological advances in weather sensors and infomation 
transfer will allow development of sophisticated hazardous 
weather detection and alert systems. Design guidelines, centered 
around the end user and the available equiprrient, need to be 
applied to these systems. 
* Microburst windshear is an weather hazard of particular 
concern and hence provides a good test case for development of 
user-oriented weather alert displays. Pilot surveys kdicate that 
currently available detection and alert systems are not adequate, 
and a system for advance detection and alert is needed. 
- The events which occurred during the 13WR operationai 
evaluation on July 11, 1988 were analyzed i r ~  the context of 
informadon transfer issues. The observations included the 
following: Variability of pilot response to similar microburse 
alerts. The verbal relay of microburst alerts was found to induce 
delays. The inclusion of microburst alerts with other routine 
messages was thought to reduce the sense of urgency of the 
alerts. Finally, PREPS have been found to be extremely 
important in validating the TDWR alerts to the user. 
A review of the current state of rnicroburst detection 
technology and the analysis of the TDWR operational evaluation 
leads to the conclusion that the integration of ground-based 
doppler radar, LLWAS and PREPS, and of a digital datalink 
such as Mode-S is the most viable near-term system for reliable 
advance warning of windshear. 
* A simple flight simulator study has indicated that display of 
windshear information with a graphical display of 
microburst position can result in significantly greater microburst 
awareness and greatly improve the probability of avoidance when 
compared with standard voice transmission. 
An opinion survey of air carrier pilots was conducted. 
Pilots feel that PREPS and visual clues are the best currently 
available methods for microburst detection, urhile LLWAS and 
airborne weather radar are less effective. Also, pilots were 
receptive to the idea of displaying windshear information on an 
EFIS display, preferring the EFIS to ATC voice 
communications. Alphanumeric information and ATIS were 
rated poorly for transmission of windshear alerts. 
When asked about rnicroburst alert information content, 
pilots specified that microburst location and intensity were the 
most important items, followed by size, movement, and intensity 
trend information. 
Research is currently in progress to further explore the 
issues involved. A part-task Boeing 7571767 simulation has been 
developed to address issues of warning content, timing, and a 
selection of alphanumeric and graphical display formats. 
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